U.S. Counterterrorism Strategy Falls Short in Confronting Africa’s Jihadist Surge
Growing Threats in the Sahel Expose Gaps in Resources, Access, and Focus
By Sierra Knoch | May 15, 2026
The rapid deterioration of the security situation in the Sahel stems in significant part from policy failures under the Biden administration and global liberal elites like French President Emmanuel Macron. Biden’s approach allowed a wave of military coups in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger to proceed with limited effective response, leading to strained partnerships, the erosion of intelligence-sharing agreements, and the eventual expulsion of U.S. forces from key bases—most critically the drone hub at Agadez in Niger. Macron’s Operation Barkhane, while tactically active for years, ultimately failed to stem the jihadist tide with reports indicating a decrease in perceived safety among West Africans with regard to the presence of French forces during Operation Barkhane.
However, studies have demonstrated that the presence of these forces correlated with increased civilian safety from terrorist incidents. The failure to demonstrate the benefit of Western led security measures by the French and the US under Biden, bred local resentment and reminders of anti-French imperialist sentiment that juntas exploited to pivot toward Russia, Jihadists, and other actors. Reports also indicated that after Barkhane ended African youth in these affected areas were more likely to support political violence and military led governments than before Operation Barkhane started.
This should never be the outcome of Western led security interventions. These missteps by Biden, Democrats and global elites created the security vacuum that jihadist groups have rapidly filled. The Trump administration’s 2026 U.S. Counterterrorism Strategy, released in May 2026, represents a good start at rebuilding African deterrence through focused pressure on top-tier threats, intelligence-driven operations, and pragmatic partnerships rather than nation-building. Yet, given the sharply increased threats documented in recent testimony and regional analysis, it is not enough. The United States clearly needs deeper engagement with willing and capable partners to halt the spread of jihadism that could eventually reach the homeland.
In his May 14, 2026, posture statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Air Force General Dagvin R.M. Anderson, Commander of U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM), painted a stark picture: “Africa has become the center of gravity for global jihadism, with West Africa accounting for over 51% of global terror-related deaths in 2024.” ISIS affiliates (ISIS-West Africa and ISIS-Sahel) and al-Qaeda’s Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) are exploiting weak governance, expanding transnational networks for fighters, weapons, and funding, and advancing toward regional capitals. JNIM has already cut off key routes and nearly threatened Bamako.
More reports underscored the core vulnerability: The Pentagon lacks sufficient resources in Africa to detect when these groups develop the capacity to strike the U.S. homeland, despite their clear “will and intent.” General Anderson stressed the urgent need for better “indication and warnings” amid diminished U.S. access, basing, and overflight rights following coups and strained partnerships. The 2026 strategy addresses Africa explicitly but frames goals narrowly: “In Africa, we have two clear goals that depart from the nation-building and interventionist policies of the past. The first is to guarantee that none of the Jihadi groups can build a base of operations that allows them to plot and execute attacks against the United States and American interests around the world. The second is to protect Christians, who have been slaughtered at the hands of these Jihadi groups.”
This reflects a shift toward intelligence-sharing, targeted strikes, and local partnerships rather than sustained footprints. Yet experts and regional dynamics reveal limitations. Abdennour Toumi, MEA Senior Consultant, notes the deep-rooted, multifaceted nature of the crisis: “This is not just a Malian issue, it is an African reality, the Tuareg are not a marginal group, but a major African nation rooted across the Sahel and North Africa. Before 2011, they were part of the Libyan state and its stability. After the collapse of al-Qadafi regime in Libya, weapons spread, fighters moved across borders, and conflicts were reignited across the Sahel. Mali has once again descended into violence.
On Saturday, April 25, coordinated attacks by jihadists from JNIM (Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims) and rebels from the Azawad Liberation Front (FLA) resulted in, among other things, the death of the Minister of Defense and the capture of the city of Kidal, in the north of the country. This deterioration of the security situation in this Sahel country is the direct consequence of “the absence of dialogue and the revocation” of the 2015 Algiers Peace Accords.” Toumi highlights how jihadist groups like JNIM and the Azawad Liberation Front exploit local grievances, ethnic tensions, and the revocation of the 2015 Algiers Peace Accords, gaining traction among disparate populations.
These groups appeal locally by addressing governance failures, marginalization, and economic despair in a region with a massive youth bulge. The U.S. Strategy correctly aims to address these issues through partnerships, but more work is needed to make this a possibility. Toumi discussed the weakness of African governments and their inability to address the growing threats saying, “In this stance, Barkhane Operation was targeting radical transnational dystopian Jihadist groups in the triangle area between Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso.
From a broader perspective, it seems that the different factions of Mali’s military and political elite are still increasingly fighting in intra-chiefs’ trench war, and have been putting the blame on France for not being a credible and serious partner with the country’s leaders in their war on terror. Causing more chaos and instability for the sub-regional countries, who are all waging war against dystopian Jihadists. This distracts attention not only from the priority of regaining state control over their territory.
However, the alibi of the war on terror did not go anywhere, to the contrary, the Jihadists’ message is echoing well among the disparate in the entire region.” Toumi went on to describe what cooperation could look like with regional powers who have a direct stake in the security issues such as Algeria.
According to Toumi Algeria is a pivotal state with long experience in political reconciliation and counterterrorism: Algeria sees Sahel stability as a matter of national security and development, has positioned itself as a counterterrorism and migration ally for Europe and the U.S., made tireless efforts to consolidate peace in Mali through the 2015 agreement, and remains vigilant against ethnic division projects such as a “Greater Azawad State” that would threaten multiple countries. Russian, Chinese, and Other Influences Complicate the Picture. The strategy prioritizes degrading state sponsorship and covert support lines but underplays how Russia and others fill vacuums.
Toumi observes, “French military and diplomatic decline in the region are enhancing the analysts’ arguments, regarding a new balance of power that is re-shuffling the cards in the region. Countries like China, Turkiye, the UAE and even Israel are already positioning themselves in a posture of sizing-down French influence and hegemony. Whereas, Russia’s ties in Mali and in the African Sahel go back to the Cold War era in the 1980s; as a result, Russia today is just replacing and advancing its pawns that were moved decades ago, knowing that the winds of the region’s geopolitical context are blowing in Moscow’s China’s and other regional powers direction. New regional and sub-regional geopolitical parameters are shaping Africa’s politics and geopolitics landscape.
France and Russia are already engaged in a battle of spheres of influence in several western and Central African countries, where Paris still looks at the region, as if it’s a legitimate backyard, as the henchman of France in light of the ongoing anti-French sentiment narrative in the region, a narrative that has sustained the dialectal equation of the dynamic of balance of power in the African Sahel and Africa in general in the super and regional powers’ big game…The Russians were accused of being a destabilizing force in the region.
Russia’s moves in Mali are part of a broader strategy to enhance influence in Africa, amid rising competition with the United States following the withdrawal of French forces and United Nations troops from the country.” General Anderson’s testimony echoes this: Russia exploits instability for resources via the Africa Corps, while China focuses on economic and military cooperation with a non-interference stance, and Iran supplies advanced weapons. These actors reshape the balance of power as French influence wanes post-Operation Barkhane. Past efforts—French, U.S., and others—achieved tactical successes but failed comprehensively due to Democrat led failures and Republican penchants for forever wars as stated in the 2026 CT document.
Now, jihadist narratives resonate amid Russian created chaos. Chaos benefits Russia, but not the citizens in the region or Western powers who become targets for strong jihadist groups. Jihadist groups do not limit targets to Christians; according to Toumi they strike “Muslims civilians, law-and-order forces and military alike,” aiming to sow widespread terror rather than pursue a coherent national project in many cases. While Christians remain a premier target due to how Christian beliefs threaten the justification for Islamic control of territory Toumi says, “Their aim is to create terror and shock the population beyond their beliefs.” Local support stems from grievances, not purely ideology—yet the White House strategy’s emphasis on protecting Christians, while morally grounded, risks oversimplifying the conflict or fueling Islamic jihad propaganda that US security intervention is akin to a religious war.
The 2026 strategy correctly identifies the intent of Sahel groups but, per General Anderson, the U.S. lacks the resourcing and access for timely indication and warning of capability shifts. Its hemispheric and top-five-group priorities, while delivering wins elsewhere, leave the Sahel’s metastasizing threat—now the global jihadism center of gravity—under-addressed amid competing influences and local complexities.
As Toumi and Anderson both illustrate, without sustained intelligence investment, adaptive partnerships that account for ethnic and governance realities, and countermeasures against Russian/Chinese opportunism, the strategy risks allowing these groups to consolidate gains. Africa’s jihadists may not yet strike the homeland routinely, but the trajectory General Anderson warns of demands more than the current framework delivers.
